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ABSTRACT. This paper argues for a subtle but important shift in the way we
view content analysis which allows for the introduction of two new variants
on this methodology. Previously, content analysis has been seen as a method
for quantifying thecontentof texts. This paper argues that we should view
content analysis as a method for countingterpretationsof content. Based on
this reconceptualization, this paper suggests two new varieties of content analysis.
Reception based content analysisallows researchers to quantify how different
audiences will understand text.Interpretive content analysis specially designed
for latent content analysis, in which researchers go beyond quantifying the most
straightforward denotative elements in a text. These new forms of content analysis
are contrasted with traditional content analysis, and the appropriate conditions for
their use are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
Content analysis has previously been defined as an objective,
systematic, and quantitative method of describing the content of
texts (Kassarjian, 1977). In this paper, “content analysis” will be
used as a more general term for methodologies that code text
into categories and then count the frequencies of occurrences
within each category1. This broader definition retains the idea that
content analysis is quantitative, but leaves open for discussion when
researchers should strive for “objectivity” (replicability might be a
better term) and systematization.
Figure 1 (Appendix II) presents an overview of the traditional
content analytic sequence. Suppose researchers wanted to know
if the percentage of female spokespeople in U.S. magazine ads
had increased since 1950. From the total body of U.S. magazine
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advertising since 1950, the researchers would select a represen-
tative sample of ads, which are labeled in figure 1 as the focal
texts. The researchers would then train coders1−n (also called raters)
in a system of explicitly formulated rules for classifying the ads
into categories. The raters would follow these rules to produce
codings1−n indicating whether or not the ad had a female spokes-
person. If all goes well, the coders should agree on whether any
given ad has a female spokesperson, such that high levels of agree-
ment among the coders constitutes an important indicator that the
coding was successful. These codings then form the data to be
analyzed and interpreted by the researcher. In the present example,
the researcher would look for changes over time in the percent of
ads coded as having female spokespeople.
This simplified description of traditional content analysis is based
on a synthesis of past work,2 and is consistent with Kassarjian’s
(1977) paper on this subject. Since its publication, Kassarjian (1977)
has become the normative procedure for content analysis within
consumer research (Kolbe and Burnett, 1991). Papers rarely reach
this status without containing much that is good, and I do not
advocate abandoning what has become the standard content analytic
methodology. Instead, I want to take the next step forward and
move beyond a one-size-fits-all approach to content analysis. As
a compliment to traditional content analysis, I advocate two new
methodologies –interpretive content analysisandreception based
content analysis, which are discussed in detail below.
Two caveats are in order. First, these methodologies are intended
to be flexible. The precisely correct methodology to use in any situ-
ation may differ from the prototypes I am presenting here, and may
combine some aspects of each of them. Second, the purpose of this
paper is to introduce two techniques and discuss when it is most
appropriate to use them. Further details of their implementation at a
workbench level will have to be worked out in subsequent papers
after researchers have accumulated experience in their use. This
article begins by discussing interpretive and reception based content
analysis in turn (see Table 1 [Appendix I] for an overview), followed
by a more detailed discussion of when they should be applied.
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INTERPRETIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS
Traditional content analysis is often divided into manifest and
latent content analysis (Lasswell, 1941). Manifest content analysis
looks at the most obvious and straightforward meanings of a text
(e.g. does the ad explicitly claim that the car has more than 100
horsepower), whereas latent content analysis ferrets out a text’s
subtler meanings (e.g. does the ad position the car as powerful).
Manifest and latent content analysis look at different aspects of a
text, but they use the same traditional content analytic methodology
to conduct the research. It has long been recognized that tradi-
tional content analysis presents special difficulties when applied to
“latent content” (Lasswell, 1941). These difficulties center around
the coding procedure and training coders, and manifest themselves
in low levels of interrater agreement about how a text should be
coded. “The extreme difficulty of this validation task (i.e. gaining
acceptable levels of interrater agreement) became apparent in the
1930s and 1940s when the pioneers of content analysis attempted to
expand their technique beyond explicit message content” (Ringold
and Calfee, 1990, p. 31). These problems with latent content
analysis are traceable to the complexity of its analytic categories.
[T]he use of complicated and sophisticated categories creates serious problems in
reliability. This is the problem of the balance between reliability of the procedures
on the one hand and the richness of the categories on the other. What does it matter
that we gain reliability if in the process we lose all our insights? This critical area
of content analysis, i.e., the reliability of complex categories, still needs to be
adequately handled (Berelson, 1952: p. 514).
Berelson wrote that passage over 40 years ago, but the problem
“still needs to be adequately handled” today, and is growing in
importance with the increased use of qualitative data and textual
analysis within consumer research. In an attempt to address this
problem, interpretive content analysis is suggested as a method for
latent content analysis and other more complex coding tasks.
To understand interpretive content analysis, we need a clearer
understanding of the difference between manifest and latent content.
The semiotic theory of denotative and connotative meanings can be
helpful here (Berelson, 1952: p. 20). Denotative meanings (manifest
content) identify parts of the text; they are the “first-order significa-
tion (Eco, 1976) and correspond to common sense, obvious meaning
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(Fiske, 1982)“ (Mick and Buhl, 1992: p. 320). For example, Figure 2
(Appendix II) contains denotative meanings in both visual images
and text. Some of the denotative meanings in Figure 2 are that a
man is standing in front of a partially assembled automobile body.
Connotative meanings (latent content) are arrived at by combining
individual elements in a text to understand the meaning of the whole.
For example, part of the text in Figure 2 reads, “When I see one of
our freshly painted cars, I feel it’s a piece of art.” By combining
the denotative (commonsense, obvious) meaning of the sentence
with the denotative meaning of the visual image, we understand the
connotations (latent content) of this ad: (a) the man in the photo
has painted the car, (b) his physical stance conveys confidence and
pride in his work, (c) his beard, handlebar mustache, and white
hairnet pushed out to one side like a French beret lend him an artistic
persona.
Lasswell distinguishes between latent and manifest content by
calling latent content “an interpretation” (1941: p. 2), implying that
manifest content is somehownotan interpretation. I argue that both
manifest and latent content are interpretations. Random House’s
Webster’s Dictionary defines interpretation as “the assignment of
meaning to abstract symbols.” Any time we look at black marks
on a piece of paper and recognize them as a meaningful word, we
are making an interpretation. Likewise with visual images, when
we perceive patches of color as meaningful objects like a person or
an auto body, we are also making an interpretation (Scott, 1994).
Denotative interpretations are so highly conventional and frequently
practiced that we often create them without being aware that we
are performing an interpretive act. This can create the illusion that
the denotative meanings we perceive are parts of the physical text
itself, not interpretations. But manifest content analysis is not a sign-
vehicle3 analysis in which “the results describe a physical property
of the communication,” i.e. “black-marks-on-white” (Janis, 1943:
p. 430). Both manifest and latent content analysis are forms of
“semantic” analysis, which is to say they are both about the inter-
pretation of meanings, not physical ink on paper. The fact that both
manifest and latent content are interpretations is important, because,
as we will see, it suggests a possible method for improving the
ability of content analysis to deal with connotative (i.e. latent) mean-
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ings. But before I can present the proposed solution to our problem,
we need to explore the problem itself in more detail.
The Need for Interpretive Content Analysis
Tradition content analysis can be divided into three stages: selec-
tion of the focal texts, coding the focal texts, and interpreting the
results of the coding. It is during the middle step – coding the data
– that connotative categories cause problems. These problems arise
primarily because for connotative interpretations: (a) coding cannot
follow a series of coding rules, (b) the amount of training needed
for the coders may be prohibitive, and (c) properly making inter-
pretations requires “theoretical sensitivity” (Glaser, 1978) which not
everyone possesses in equal measure and which can be maximized
through collaboration rather than independent judgments.
Connotation and coding rules. Since its inception in the 1940s and
1950s, traditional content analysis has advocated the use of formal
coding rules to increase intercoder agreement. For example, if the
researchers were interested in the percentage of women shown in
job settings who had clerical vs. managerial positions, they might
devise a coding rule which says that women shown typing are to
be coded as secretaries. This promotion of coding rules was more
than a convenient way to increase interrater reliability: it was a
procedure based on a theory about how people derive meaning
from texts. When traditional content analysis methodology was
first developing, social scientific thought was generally consistent
with Parsons’ view that people followed rules of interpretation that
allowed them to find meaning (Feldman, 1995). If the process of
finding meaning in a text is essentially a matter of following rules,
then it seems natural and appropriate to make these rules explicit
and have raters follow them when coding.
Later, this view was successfully challenged by Garfinkel (1967)
who showed that interpretation is completely context-dependent. As
Feldman (1995) summarizes Garfinkel’s position:
Thus the whole notion of rule becomes inadequate because for each context there
would have to be another rule. Because every context is unique and contexts are
constantly emerging, there cannot be a set of preexisting rules that are waiting to
be followed (p.11).
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While coding rules can successfully increase interrater agree-
ment, they do so at a price. Generally, they do a poor job of dealing
with context effects that influence how a given piece of text will
be understood. The role of context can be seen in Figure 2 where
the model takes on an artistic persona, but in a different context
the same model in the same outfit might lack any association to
the arts. In theory, one could develop a very complex set of coding
rules that would specify how textual element X is to be coded if
it is found in context Y. As a practical matter, though, the number
of possible contexts is infinite. So this strategy would likely prove
intractable. Coding rules have a hard time dealing with context
effects. Since context has a particularly strong effect on connot-
ative interpretations, coding rules are inappropriate for interpretive
content analysis.
As Spiggle (1994) writes,
In interpretation the investigator does not engage a set of operations (i.e. coding
rules). Rather, interpretation occurs as a gestalt shift and represents a synthetic,
holistic, and illuminating grasp of meaning, as in deciphering a code (p. 497,
italics and parenthetical comment not in original).
Connotative coding requires expertise. Connotative coding also
frequently requires a prohibitively high level of expertise. The
researchers coding qualitative data may have spent dozens of hours
conducting interviews, hundreds of hours conducting participant
observations, and years conducting background reading in devel-
oping their perspectives. It’s not realistic to expect that students or
other assistants could easily receive the training necessary to do the
coding properly. When the focal texts are mass media publications,
the level of expertise can also be quite high. For example, histor-
ical analysis may require a detailed understanding of the historical
context in which the focal texts were created.
Connotative coding is best done collaboratively. This high level of
expertise is needed because connotative interpretation is frequently
difficult. Connotative interpretation requires theoretical sensitivity,
which is “a personal quality of the researcher,. . . an awareness of
the subtleties of meaning of the data” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990:
p. 41). Because people differ in their levels of theoretical sens-
itivity, achieving interrater agreement for connotative codings is
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not always possible. More importantly, connotative coding is best
conducted collaboratively because the theoretical sensitivity of a
group of researchers working together is likely to be higher than
any member of the group working alone. Unfortunately, traditional
content analysis is incompatible with coding data collaboratively
since coding needs to be done independently to compute interrater
reliability statistics.
DESCRIPTION OF INTERPRETIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS
Since coding for connotative meanings should avoid coding rules,
can require high levels of expertise, and is best done collaborat-
ively rather than independently, we can see that there is a serious
inconsistency between the needs of connotative coding and tradi-
tional content analytic methodology. Interpretive content analysis is
proposed as an alternative to traditional content analysis for quanti-
fying connotative interpretations (see Table I). Interpretive content
analysis differs from traditional content analysis in the way the
coding is done and in how coding quality is assessed. In traditional
content analysis, multiple coders each independently follow coding
rules to code the texts. In interpretive content analysis, multiple
coders are recommended because collaborative work is likely to
be of higher quality, but in principle a single coder is sufficient.
When multiple coders are used, they work cooperatively rather than
independently.
Traditional content analysts may not code the entire focal text;
instead they may focus on a part of the text, such as the headline in
a magazine ad. Unfortunately, as Kepplinger (1989) writes, in the
coding process “related information. . . is divided into meaningful
parts . . . In dividing related information into parts, the relationship
between the parts is usually neglected” (p. 177). Interpretive content
analysis may also focus on a part of the text such as the ad headline
as the unit of analysis. But in coding the headline, researchers would
be careful to take a holistic approach and consider how the rest of
the text would influence the interpretation of the part being coded.
Current thinking on how people come to understand texts stresses
that readers interpret any part of the text, such as a word or phrase,
in light of the rest of the text (i.e. based on a “hermeneutic circle”
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Arnold and Fischer, 1994; Thompson et al., 1989; Thompson et al.,
1994). Coding selected parts of a text is a legitimate technique, but
in interpretive content analysis the process of coding these parts
does not treat them as if they existed in isolation apart from the rest
of the text from which they were taken. Because interpretive content
analysis is not restricted by coding rules, it has the flexibility to take
context more fully into account.
In traditional content analysis, the quality of the coding is
assessed through interrater reliability. Interpretive content analysis
substitutespublic justifiability for interrater reliability. To achieve
public justifiability, the researchers include the focal texts, their
codings, and, if necessary, a justification of their codings along with
the manuscript when submitting it for publication. In this way, the
quality of their coding can be directly assessed by the reviewers. In
general, all the focal texts would be included as an appendix along
with the paper when it was submitted for publication. However, in
instances where a very large number of texts were coded, a random
sample of the coded texts could be submitted. Because this would
be a random sample, it would prevent authors from cherry picking
the clearest coding examples for submission.
For example, suppose one wished to determine if hard-sell
magazine advertising had become less prevalent in the past 20 years.
Determining if an ad is hard sell requires connotative interpretation.
Researchers would develop a definition of hard sell advertising, but
they would not create a rigid set of coding rules to operationalize
that definition. Instead, they would carefully examine each text to
judge, based on the text as a whole considered within the context
of its creation and reception, whether it should be categorized as
hard sell. When submitting the paper for publication, they would
attach an appendix containing a copy of the ads they analyzed and
indicating how they coded each ad. If some of the codings were not
straight forward, the authors could include a brief justification for
their coding. The reviewers would then look through as many of
the focal texts as it takes to satisfy them that the authors’ codings
accurately reflect the authors’ definitions of hard and soft sell.
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Interrater Reliability or Public Justifiability?
Eliminating the interrater reliability statistic is a significant change
that requires further discussion. Summarizing the previous liter-
ature, Kassarjian (1977) includes “objectivity” in his definition of
content analysis. This objectivity stems from the application of
coding rules (Holsti, 1968) and is measured by interrater reliab-
ility. Unfortunately, objectivity is not the best word to use for this
construct4 because it obscures the difference between physical prop-
erties of objects which exist whether we know they’re there or not,
and meanings which only exist when someone perceives or exper-
iences them. Therefore, instead of objectivity, it is clearer to talk
about intersubjectivity, or better still, the independent replicability
of interpretations.
What does independent replicability do for us? First, it provides
a measure of quality control. If coding was done carelessly, one
would expect a high degree of randomness which would lead to low
levels of independent replicability. In interpretive content analysis,
this quality control function is handled directly by the reviewers, and
when work is done collaboratively, quality should also be ensured by
the co-authors. In traditional content analysis, independent replic-
ability provides evidence that the coding rules were followed. Since
there are no coding rules in interpretive content analysis, this point
becomes moot. It should also be noted that in traditional content
analysis, the coders have received training in how they should code
the texts and are following coding rules rather than their own intu-
itions. Therefore interrater reliability in no way indicates that the
codings reflect a popular or widespread interpretation of the texts.
It is also sometimes claimed that independent replicability “gives
scientific standing to content analysis” (Kassarjian, 1977: p. 9; see
also Berelson 1954; Holsti, 1968; Janis, 1943). However, justifi-
ability is just as scientifically legitimate as interreater reliability.
In Figure 1, arrow E depicts the interpretation of the codings by
the researcher. Interpreting the coded data, like interpreting exper-
imental or survey data, requires the construction of a complex
connotative interpretation. In creating these connotative interpret-
ations, researchers do not turn their data over to graduate students,
hoping that if three students independently come up with the same
interpretation they have proved their point. After all, the graduate
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students may not do the best job of interpreting the data. So long
as the researchers can justify their interpretations to their peers, it
doesn’t matter if other researchers looking at the same data would
have independently come to the same conclusions. As this example
illustrates, justifiability, not interrater reliability, is the standard
scientific approach for dealing with connotative interpretations.
Why, then, is the denotative coding of focal texts in traditional
content analysis (Figure 1, arrow C) treated differently from the
final connotative interpretation of data by the researcher (Figure 1,
arrow E)? The difference, I argue, is one of degree, not kind. Coding
texts and interpreting data are both the same kind of activity-they are
both interpretations. But as interpretations become more complex, it
makes sense to shift from interrater reliability to public justifiability.
Therefore, as content analysis shifts from denotative to connotative
coding categories, we should also shift from interrater reliability to
justifiability. Because interpretive content analysis allows journal
reviewers to directly examine the coding of the texts, it increases
their power in the publication process. With this increased power
comes a need for restraint based on a sophisticated understanding
of the nature of interpretation. Interpretations are not objective, but
as Figure 1 shows, the researcher makes an interpretation from a
particular perspective. Because the researchers and reviewers may
differ in the perspective from which they approach the data, there
will always be room for rival interpretations. In Thompson’s (1990)
terms, these interpretations are “conceptual gestalts” in which “the
evaluator may disagree with the interpretation while still seeing how
the interpretive pattern derives from the data” (p. 28). Therefore,
the reviewers’ role is to make sure that the interpretations can be
compellingly justified by the data, even if they are not identical to
their own interpretations.
Some readers may object that this seems to violate one of the
basic principles of good science. After all, isn’t the goal of research
to generate a pattern of data that allows for only one plausible
explanation? In experimental research, if a reviewer can present an
explanation for the data which is equally plausible to the interpret-
ation presented by the author, this is generally considered a serious
problem. But in experimental research, this pattern of data is usually
generated through multiple experiments. The results of a series of
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experiments, not any single experiment, are expected to produce
a unique explanation for the data. In interpretive content analysis,
the pattern of data created by coding multiple texts should allow
for fewer explanations than any individual text. But when coding
any particular text, it is not realistic to insist that the researchers
demonstrate the impossibility of coding the text in a different way.
It is enough for the researchers to show that their codings are at
least as plausible and compelling as rival interpretations. It should
also be recognized that in experimental research, the researcher has
the power to create an experimental situation designed to rule out
rival hypotheses. But interpretive content analysis is a more natur-
alistic method. Researchers frequently don’t exercise the same level
of influence on the nature of the data being interpreted, and this
increases the likelihood of rival interpretations. Finally, it should
be acknowledged that unique explanation is a goal in experimental
research that is only temporarily achieved, if at all. In time, a
different researcher viewing the data from a different theoretical
perspective will inevitably come up with a rival interpretation.
Hence the unending movement of scientific thought.
Qualitative researchers may object that turning over their data to
reviewers is too reminiscent of Lincoln and Guba’s (1985: ch. 11)
discredited notion of “auditing” ethnographic data (for critiques
of auditing see Belk, 1991; Holt, 1991; Thompson, 1990). This
analogy to auditing is misplaced because unlike auditing, inter-
pretive content analysis recognizes the context-bound nature of
interpretation. In his critique of auditing, Holt (1991) writes that
“interpretations should be judged on their insightfulness. . . and their
ability to convince the reader, no more” (p. 61). Interpretive content
analysis is completely consistent with this approach. But in order
for the reviewers to judge the insightfulness of the interpretations,
they must have access to the texts being interpreted.
In sum, interpretive content analysis, like traditional content
analysis, is a method for coding texts into categories and counting
the frequencies in each category. But interpretive content analysis
recognizes that coding rules and interrater agreement statistics are
not appropriate for connotative interpretation. Instead, interpretive
content analysis treats the interpretation of focal texts in the same
way that mainstream science treats the complex interpretation of
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other forms of data, i.e. by using public justifiability as the primary
means of quality control.
RECEPTION BASED CONTENT ANALYSIS
The Need for Reception Based Content Analysis
Content analysis is a method for interpreting the meaning of texts
and quantifying the frequency of those interpretations. Since mean-
ings exist in people, and people may understand the same text in
different ways, researchers face an important issue;whose under-
standing of the text should be used as the basis for coding? The
text’s authors? The text’s natural readers? The researchers? Or some
combination of these?
Berelson’s approach to this topic was to insist that content
analysis be restricted to situations in which virtually everybody
agreed on the meaning of the focal texts.
Content analysis assumes that . . . content beaccepted as a “common meeting
ground” for the communicator, the audience, and the analyst. That is, the
content analyst assumes that the “meanings” which he ascribes to the content,
by assigning it to certain categories, correspond to the “meanings” intended by
the communicator and/or understood by the audience (Berelson, 1952: p. 19).
This may occur in some cases, but as Kepplinger (1989, p. 175)
points out, “the common meeting ground, as we know today, is prob-
ably even more limited than Berelson supposed it to be.” Mick and
Politi (1989) have noted the difficulty of agreeing on even denotative
meaning, and Jacoby et al. (1980) and Hoyer and Jacoby (1985)
have shown the surprising frequency with which even seemingly
straightforward statements are understood differently by different
people. Furthermore, coding tasks that seem straightforward at the
outset often end up being rather complex. This paper began with
an example about a hypothetical researcher who wanted to know
if the number of female spokespeople had increased since 1950.
This would seem to be as straightforward a question as one is likely
to get. Deciding if someone is male or female should not be too
problematic, but what exactly is a spokesperson? Does Figure 3
(Appendix II) contain a spokesperson or just a model? The answer
probably depends on the reader’s social group. Too many people
IMPROVING THE ABILITY OF CONTENT ANALYSES 151
outside of the fashion, gay, or certain music communities, the
answer is likely to be a model. But MAC targets their makeup
at professional models who would instantly recognize RuPaul as
a celebrity endorser and hence a true spokesperson (RuPaul is
the world’s leading transvestite model and singer. Sometimes even
gender isn’t as simple as it seems). Gilly (1988) ran into a similar
problem when she coded television ads for whether the setting of
the advertisement was a private residence, store/restaurant, occupa-
tional setting, outdoors, or other. Even with this very simple coding
scheme, the raters agreed only 67% of the time. Just because it
seems at first glance that everyone would agree on the coding of
the focal texts, it is not necessarily the case. Berelson’s answer
isn’t sufficient because restricting content analysis to his “common
ground” is too limiting.
Kassarjian (1977) takes a different approach to this problem. He
describes a central feature of content analysis as follows:
Although not independent, the study of content variables is approached apart from
the study of the communicator or the audience. The signs and symbols (Mead,
1934; Morris, 1946) are the units of analysis rather than the intent of the commu-
nicator or the actions of the interpreter. Of interest is what was said, the properties
of the stimuli, rather than what the communicator claims he said or the inter-
preter perceived to have been said. Much of consumer research has concentrated
on the characteristics, opinion, or behavior of the interpreter of communica-
tions messages or on the characteristics of the communicator. Content analysis
is the study of the message itself, and not the communicator or the audience
(p. 8).
This quote can be understood in a number of ways. The emphasis
on “the message itself” as discrete from how its authors or readers
understood it, may be interpreted as a call for sign-vehicle analysis
(though I don’t believe this was Kassarjian’s intent, the position
should be addressed). In sign-vehicle analysis, “the results describe
a physical property of the communication – for example, in this
magazine article, there are five occurrences of the following config-
uration of black-marks-on-white: ‘Germany.’ ” (Janis, 1943: p. 430).
In contrast, semantical content analysis is about themeaningof
words and images, not their physical properties. In a semantical
analysis “Germany” and “the homeland of the Germans” could be
coded into the same category because they mean basically the same
thing, but in a sign-vehicle analysis they could not be put in the same
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category because of their different physical properties. Therefore,
sign-vehicle analysis is of limited usefulness and cannot provide a
way around the question of whose interpretation of the focal texts
we care about (Janis, 1943: pp. 438–439, 1965).
A more plausible reading of Kassarjian’s quote is to see him
as privileging the researcher’s standpoint on the texts. When he
says, “of interest is what was said, the properties of the stimuli,
rather than what the communicator claims he said or the interpreter
perceived to have been said,” he means,of interest is what the
coders understood the message to sayb sed on their coding rules
and definitions. This is essentially the position taken by Kepplinger
(1989), who argues that the codings should be seen as measuring a
scientific construct which need not replicate the way the text was
understood by its author or would be understood by its natural
readers. This understanding of content analysis is appropriate in
some situations, but like sign-vehicle analysis, it prevents content
analysis for addressing many important issues to which it could
otherwise be relevant. For instance, content analysts who work with
advertising are sometimes motivated by a concern for how adver-
tising affects consumers’ purchase intentions, or in the case of social
critics, how advertising affects consumers’ attitudes about women,
minorities, wealth, technology, beauty, sexuality, etc. Since texts
only influence consumers through the consumers’ understanding
of the texts, the consumers’ readings of these ads are inherently
relevant to these research projects (for an extended discussion, see
the debate between Ringold and Calfee, 1989, 1990; versus Cohen,
1989, 1991; Pollay, 1989). If we define content analysis as excluding
consideration of how the focal texts would be understood by their
natural audience, then content analysis could not address these
issues.
There are also situations in which content analysts care about
how a text’s author, rather than its readers, would understand
it. Zinkhan and Shermohamad (1986) use content analysis of
old advertisements to test the hypothesis that American society
became more other-directed5 between 1950 and 1980. This research
assumed that advertisers were in touch with the values of their
audiences. If between 1950 and 1980 advertisements were increas-
ingly designed to appeal to other-directed consumers, then we could
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conclude that advertisers believed a shift towards other-directedness
had taken place among consumers. Zinkhan and Shermohamad were
not interested in objective properties of the ads themselves. Rather,
they used the ads as evidence to deduce what advertisers assumed
about their readers’ values and, in this way, used the ads to learn
about the social context of their creation. Here, it is the authors’
rather than the readers’ understanding of the texts that is relevant to
the theory being tested.
This concern with the author’s understanding is common when
content analysis is used to quantify qualitative interview data where
the “author” is the interview respondent. In qualitative jargon,
“emic” categories reflect the respondents’ world view, whereas
“etic” categories are researcher-defined constructs. Belk et al.
(1989) notion of sacredness is a good example of etic research.
They defined objects as sacred if the objects “reliably. . . provide
self-transcending, extraordinary experiences, and (are) capable of
being profaned” (p. 13). This definition is etic because it does not
depend on the respondents classifying the object as sacred in order
for the researchers to see it that way. In contrast, Wallendorf and
Arnould (1988) use an emic definition of “favorite positions” in their
research. The only requirement for an object to qualify as a favorite
possession was that the respondents felt it was one. If researchers
want to quantify their emic interpretations, they need to be able to
claim that their coding reflects their respondents’ understandings.
In contrast, when dealing with etic interpretations, Kassarjian’s and
Kepplinger’s position becomes much more plausible.
This analysis shows that in some cases, such as quantifying
etic interpretations of interview data, Kassarjian’s and Kepplinger’s
position may be appropriate. But in other situations, the author’s
or the natural reader’s understanding of a text may be tenaciously
attached to the research project. In these cases, one cannot get
around the need to code the text in accordance with the author’s or
natural reader’s understanding simply by claiming that the coding
reflects a “scientific construct.” Even if content analytic codings
represent a scientific construct, one is still left with the ques-
tion of construct validity: Does the construct measure what it is
supposed to measure? This brings us to the question of what is
the construct supposed to measure? In every case, the construct
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measures someone’s interpretation of the focal texts. Depending on
the specifics of the research, that someone may be the texts’ authors,
the researchers, or some identified group of readers.6 Henceforth, I
will use the termfocal interpretersto describe those people whose
understandings of the texts are of interest. Reception based content
analysis was designed to ensure that the codings reflect the focal
interpreters’ understandings as accurately as possible in situations
when the researchers are not the focal interpreters.
Description of Reception Based Content Analysis
We have just seen that the identity of the focal interpreters depends
on the research question being asked. At times, the researchers
themselves may be the focal interpreters, but in other situations
the focal interpreters might be some other identifiable population,
say high school students or full-time homemakers. Reception based
content analysis is designed around a simple premise – if you want
to know how a group of people, say full-time homemakers, would
understand a set of texts, it makes sense to ask them.
“Reception research” is a general term for studies in which
readers are asked how they understand particular texts (see review
in Stern, 1993). Past work has included depth interviews (Mick and
Buhl, 1992), focus groups (Elliot et al., 1993), and audience ethno-
graphies (Schroder, 1994). These qualitative approaches usually
explore in rich detail how readers interpret a small number of texts,
whereas content analysis generally involves a less detailed look at a
larger number of texts. Therefore, I have coined the term reception
based content analysis to describe a fusion of reception research and
content analysis in which direct reader input is used to code texts
into categories producing quantitative results.
Reception based content analysis is a fusion of survey research
and traditional content analysis (see Table 1). It is designed to
increase confidence that the codings reflect the views of the focal
interpreters in situations where the researchers are not the focal
interpreters. Reception based content analysis is the same as tradi-
tional content analysis in the selection of the focal texts, but differs
in the selection and training of the coders, the value of intercoder
agreement, the reporting of the results, and the number of coders
needed.
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Selection of coders. In traditional content analysis, the coders are
generally the researchers or their students. But in reception based
content analysis, the coders are representative of the focal inter-
preters. If the research is motivated by a concern that certain ads
have particular effects on high school students, then the coders
would be drawn from the population of high school students. It
is unlikely that a perfectly representative sample of high school
students could be obtained, but even an imperfect sample of high
school students is a step in the right direction.
Training of coders. In traditional content analysis, the coders
are trained to follow coding rules which are seen as increasing
objectivity (Holsti, 1968: p. 588; Kassarjian, 1977: p. 9) because
“detailed rules and procedures reduce judges’ subjective biases”
(Kolbe and Burnett, 1991: p. 245). In reception based content
analysis, the goal is not to eliminate subjectivity, but to measure
the subjective readings of the focal interpreters. Therefore, in recep-
tion based content analysis, raters code the focal texts according to
their own intuitive understandings of the texts’ meaning rather than
following predetermined coding rules.
Intercoder agreement. In traditional content analysis, intercoder
agreement is an important sign of quality because it indicates that
the coders were closely following the coding rules (Kassarjian,
1977: p. 9). Since there are no coding rules in reception based
content analysis, interrater agreement is no longer valuable and is
not used to judge the quality of the coding process. In traditional
content analysis, if two-thirds of the raters think the woman in
the magazine ad is a secretary, but one-third think she’s an exec-
utive, this is a problem. But in reception based content analysis,
it’s not a problem, it’s a finding. There is no reason why different
readers should agree on the meaning of a text. Any attempt to create
consensus where none naturally exists distorts the findings.
Reporting the findings. The results of a reception based content
analysis can be reported in such a way that they closely resemble
the results of a traditional content analysis. Consider the following
two hypothetical findings.
156 AARON AHUVIA
Hypothetical traditional content analysis finding: Forty’seven percent of the
female models that appear in advertisements inPlayboywere shown in seductive
poses, whereas only 23% of the female models in Newsweek were posed
seductively.
Hypothetical reception based content analysis finding: On average, men
aged 18–35 who subscribe to bothPlayboy and Newsweekfelt that 47% of
the female models that appear in advertisements inPlayboy were shown in
seductive poses, whereas only 23% of the female models inNewsweekwere
posed seductively.
However, one could also do a more detailed analysis by looking
at differences in the way coders understood the texts. The hypo-
thetical reception based content analysis finding might continue as
follows.
Social class appears to play a role in how these men perceived seductiveness. The
15 men who came from working class backgrounds labeled 55% of thePlayboy
models as seductive and 30% of theN wsweekmodels as seductive. In contrast,
the 17 men from upper middle class backgrounds labeled 42% of the women
in Playboyads as seductive and only 19% of the women inNewsweekads as
seductive (chi square for social class significant at 0.05).
This potential for studying the differences in the way texts are
understood by different audiences opens up a vast array of research
possibilities for reception based content analysis that were not
available using traditional content analysis.
The number of coders needed. Reception based content analysis
may report a finding such as 50% of the raters thought text A
belonged in category X, but 50% thought it belonged in category
Y. If this statistic is based on two raters disagreeing with each other,
it would be highly unreliable to even tentatively project it onto some
larger population. Therefore, the use of reception based content
analysis suggests that more than the customary two or three raters
may be needed to code the focal texts. But just how many raters are
required for a reception based content analysis?
As with any survey, the less variance there is in the population,
the smaller the sample size needed. If the variance is 0, then an N of
1 is perfect. If the variance approaches 0, then an N of 2 or 3 may
indeed be fine. But if you find a high level of disagreement between
coders, a larger sample of coders will be needed. Unfortunately, it is
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difficult to specify apriori the correct number of coders for any given
research project, since the exact number of coders needed would
depend on the observed level of variance and the desired level of
confidence.
Is Reception Based Content Analysis Practical?
Reception based content analysis could potentially be applied in
three general situations: (1) understanding how readers interpret
mass media texts, (2) understanding what authors of mass media
texts meant by those texts, or (3) understanding what interview
respondents or experimental subjects meant by their comments. In
general, reception based content analysis is recommended in the first
situation, when researchers are interested in learning about the inter-
pretation of mass media texts by contemporary7 audiences, but it
usually is not appropriate in the second or third scenarios. Although
reception based content analysis is not practical in all three situ-
ations, understanding the interpretation of mass media texts is an
important area of study and improving research methodology in this
one area would make a significant contribution.
In the second situation, the application of reception based content
analysis to understanding what authors of mass media texts meant
by those texts may sound good in principle. If you want to know
what authors meant by their texts, why not ask them? Unfortunately,
this approach is rarely feasible. Sometimes the author is no longer
living, and living authors of important texts are often celebrities who
are not known to be generous with their time. If the focal texts are
ads, further problems arise because advertising agencies consider
their thought processes confidential. Even when one can get an inter-
view with the author, if the text is controversial one has good reason
to doubt the veracity of her or his statements. Finally, if one wished
to analyze a large number of published texts, performing authorial
interviews would prove so cumbersome that it would likely scuttle
the research entirely.
In the third situation, when working with qualitative interview
data or subject protocols, reception based content analysis is also
unlikely to be practical. Coding interview data is generally more
complex, time consuming, and tedious than responding to mass
media texts, so interview respondents or experimental subjects are
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unlikely be cooperative. However, “member checks” (Miles and
Huberman, 1984: p. 142), in which qualitative researchers get feed-
back on their codings and interpretations from informants, is a
common practice. Member checks are a practical solution to the
need for input from focal interpreters which is fully consistent
with the logic underlying reception based content analysis. As
such, member checks are also primarily relevant when interested
in verifying researchers understandings of emic, rather than etic,
constructs (Wallendorf and Belk, 1989: p. 75).
It should also be noted that the need for reception based content
analysis is significantly lessened when dealing with qualitative inter-
view data or subject protocols. In traditional content analysis, if a
rater looks at a mass media text and tries to surmise how some focal
interpreters would understand it, those focal interpreters have had
no direct input into the research process. Reception based content
analysis is important in this situation because it allows the focal
interpreters a voice in explaining their own understandings. But
when coding qualitative interview data or subject protocols, the data
comes from the focal interpreter in the first place. In the case of
interview data, a skilled interviewer should have encouraged the
respondent to elaborate on any ambiguous or unclear statements
during the interview, and may have recontacted the informant after
the interview to clear up any confusing elements. In these cases,
having respondents code their own comments may be redundant,
since they have already expressed their views in the initial comments
being coded.
When reception based content analysis is indicated but cannot
be used because of practical problems, interpretive content analysis
may be the next best choice. Surmising how someone else would
understand a text is a complex task that requires a detailed under-
standing of the historical, social, and linguistic context in which the
interpretation is taking place. Because of the complexity of the inter-
pretations involved, it is likely that interpretive content analysis will
be a more appropriate methodology than traditional content analysis
for this research. In the following section, issues of when to use each
type of content analysis are discussed in more detail.
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INTERACTIONS BETWEEN INTERPRETIVE AND RECEPTION
BASED CONTENT ANALYSIS
Content analysis allows for quantitative claims about the prevalence
of a certain type of textual interpretation. Interpretive researchers
can analyze interview data and report that certain themes emerged,
but if they want to claim that one theme was more prevalent than
another, they need a basis for that comparison. Similarly, literary
theorists can claim that any given ad has a certain meaning, but if
they want to say that this meaning is more typical of one genre than
another, they need some quantitative basis on which to make the
claim. Content analysis can provide a basis for these quantitative
claims, but determining which type of content analysis is appro-
priate is a complex question. Table 2 (Appendix I) outlines which
type of content analysis is likely to be appropriate in each situation.
Table 2 is based on three factors8: the complexity of the coding task,
the identity of the focal interpreters, and practical issues that may
limit the use reception based content analysis.
Traditional content analysis has at least one undeniable strength
– it’s doable. As Babbie (1975) writes, “probably the greatest
advantage of (traditional) content analysis is the economy in terms
of both time and money” (p. 232). When compared to reception
based content analysis, traditional content analysis saves a lot of
time and effort by eliminating the need to gain the cooperation of
respondents. When compared to interpretive content analysis, tradi-
tional content analysis is somewhat less work for the author – who
doesn’t have to compile materials to send to the reviewers – and it
is also less work for the reviewers. Therefore, if traditional content
analysis can effectively do what we want it to do, it may be preferred
over its more labor-intensive alternatives.
The horizontal axis of Table 2 distinguishes between situations in
which the researchers are, or are not, the focal interpreters. Recep-
tion based content analysis is only applicable when the researchers
are not the focal interpreters. But even when this condition is met,
there are times when traditional or interpretive content analysis
would be more appropriate. As cell 2 of Table 2 indicates, traditional
content analysis is recommended when there is a strong natural
consensus about the meaning of the texts, so the researchers and
the focal interpreters all agree on how a text should be coded (i.e.
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Berelson’s “common ground”). If everyone would code the text the
same way, it doesn’t matter who does the coding, so reception based
content analysis is not worth the effort.
It should be noted that what I am calling an tural consensus is
not measured by conventional interrater reliability figures. This is
because the coders in most studies have been trained in how they
should code the texts. If one wishes to claim that a coding task is so
obvious that anyone would do it is the same way, then no training of
coders or coding rules should be needed.
This strong natural consensus is most likely to occur when the
codings reflect interpretations of simple denotative meanings. But as
we saw above, denotative coding isn’t always simple and opinions
about denotative meanings can be surprisingly diverse. Therefore,
using denotative coding categories is not sufficient for showing that
a strong natural consensus exists. How then can we know if we
are on “common ground” with regards to the text’s meaning? I
suggest that this should be determined empirically. An initial coding
of a subset of the focal texts could be performed by a group of
coders including representatives of the focal interpreters and the
researchers or their assistants. Each coder should be provided with
a general definition of the coding categories, but they should not
be trained in how to code the text or provided with specific coding
rules. If a strong consensus between the coders is established, then a
traditional content analysis would be justified. A “strong consensus”
could be operationalized as an interrater agreement of 90%, or
its equivalent using more sophisticated statistics such as Cohen’s
Kappa (1960)9, Perreault and Leigh’s (1989) reliability index, or
Rust and Cooil’s PRL statistic (1994).
As we move vertically down Table 2, we leave Berelson’s
common ground for situations in which the text is not always under-
stood in the same way. When the text is likely to be understood
differently by different readers, and the researchers are not the
focal interpreters, reception based content analysis should be used
if possible (cells 4 and 7). When reception based content analysis
is not practical, interpretive or traditional content analysis should
be used, depending on the complexity of the coding task (cells 5
and 8). One might think that since traditional content analysis is
likely to be most appropriate for denotative coding tasks, it should
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always be recommended in cell 5. However, even if the coding
categories reflect denotative meanings, inferring how someone else
(say a reader from a different historical period) would approach
the text adds a level of complexity that might require interpretive
content analysis.
When the researchers themselves are the focal interpreters,
one needs to choose between traditional and interpretive content
analysis. Here the choice is simply based on the difficulty and
complexity of the coding task. As we move from cells 1 and 3 to cell
6, the complexity of the coding increases and interpretive content
analysis becomes the recommended methodology.
CONCLUSION
This paper asks readers to make a subtle but important shift in the
way they view content analysis. Previously, one might have seen
content analysis as a method for counting content. I am proposing
that we view content analysis as a method for counting interpreta-
tions of content. Once one recognizes that content analysis counts
interpretations of content, several questions arise. What is the best
way to create those interpretations? How should we judge the
quality of those interpretations? Whose interpretations should we
care about?
In answering these and related questions, we uncover the need
for a greater variety of content analytic methodologies. There is
no one best way to generate and evaluate interpretations. Instead,
the best methodology depends on the ambiguity and complexity
of the interpretive task. For simple denotative interpretations, tradi-
tional content analysis may be the best option. But coding qualit-
ative interview data or performing latent content analysis is likely
to benefit from the greater flexibility allowed within interpretive
content analysis. The question of whose interpretations we should
care about also has no simple answer. When the coding categories
reflect etic constructs, the researcher is generally the most qualified
person to make the interpretations, whereas when our research is
motivated by a concern with how the texts will be understood by
their natural readers, it makes sense to get the reader’s input when
coding the texts. Ultimately, the choice of the focal interpreters
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will have to be decided on a case-by-case basis in keeping with
the theory under investigation and the assumptions motivating the
research.
Interpretive content analysis and reception based content analysis
will improve our existing research and open up new research
opportunities. Using reception based content analysis, not only can
we have a clearer idea about the social impact of advertising and
other texts, but we can explore differences in the way the same focal
texts will be understood by different populations of readers. Using
interpretive content analysis, qualitative researchers may be more
inclined to explore the quantitative aspects of their data than they
would if they had to use traditional content analysis. Similarly, latent
content analysis will be greatly facilitated by interpretive content
analysis, allowing us to take a more holistic approach to mass media
texts.
The basic content analytic methodology was formulated about
40 years ago. Since then, various conceptual variants such as sign-
vehicle analysis and latent content analysis have been developed.
But these conceptual variants have not produced new and different
methodological processes. Given the increased attention being paid
to the role of interpretation in research with the “interpretive turn”
in the social sciences, it makes sense to expand our toolbox of
content analytic techniques accordingly. Interpretive and reception
based content analysis are an attempt to do just that. They open up
new possibilities for content analysis which allow for more complex
interpretations of the focal texts and recognize that every inter-
pretation must be made from a particular perspective, not from an
objective foundation.
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NOTES
1 When content analysis is used to quantify qualitative data collected through
thought listing tasks or other related techniques, it is sometimes called protocol
analysis (Ericson and Simon, 1984).
2 This past work includes Babbie, 1975; Berelson, 1952, 1954; Fowles and
Horner, 1975; Holbrook, 1977; Holsti, 1968; Janis, 1943, 1965; Kaplan, 1943;
Kepplinger, 1989; Pollay, 1983; and Weber, 1985.
3 For criticisms of sign-vehicle analysis which explain why it is rarely used, see
Janis (1943: pp. 4380-439).
4 Kassarjian’s comment that he is talking about “replicability, reliability, or what
Berelsonhas chosen to callobjectivity,” hints that he, too, may not have felt
objectivity was the best word for this construct (Kassarjian, 1977: p. 9, italics
added). These comments are therefore not meant as a criticism of Kassarjian,
who I recognize as simply adopting the established usage of the term.
5 Becoming more “other-directed” means becoming more concerned with “the
expectations and preferences of others,” as opposed to inner-directed (following
an internalized set of goals), or tradition-directed (following tradition).
6 It has been suggested that my position fails to differentiate between what
content analysis isabout, and what it isused for. In this view, content analysis
is about the text as interpreted by the coders, but it is used for making predictions
about how the text would be understood by other focal interpreters. This stance
doesn’t recognize that content analysis can only legitimately be used to make
inferences about how the text would be understood by other focal interpreters
if the codings of the texts reflect the way the texts would be understood by those
readers. So we are stuck right back were we started, needing to establish a connec-
tion between the way the text is coded and the way it is understood by some group
of focal interpreters.
7 Clearly, if one is interested in studying the social impact of advertising in the
1890s, the focal readers are no longer around to be interviewed. In this situation,
skilled researchers would have to attempt to infer the focal readers’ understand-
ings.
8 This analysis assumes that there is variance along these dimensions but does
not attempt to present a comprehensive theory of when researchers will be the
focal interpreters or what determines the complexity of the coding task.





Over View of Traditional, Interpretive, and Reception Based Content Analysis
Issue Traditional content Interpretive content Reception based
abalysis analysis content analysis
Selection Focal texts are Same. Same.
of focal selected to be
texts representative of the
larger population of
texts which are of
theoretical concern.
Selection Coders are usually Coders are usually Coders should be
of coders the researchers, but the researchers, but representative of the
some methodologists may be highly trained pupulation of focal
advocated coders who assistants. interpreters. The focal
are independent of interpreters are
the researchers to determined by the
increase objectivity. theory motivating the
research.
Training of Coders are trained to Generally, coders will
coders follow coding rules need high leves of
and minimize the use expertise to under-
of their subjective stand the context of
intutition. the focal texts’ produc-
tion or reception.
Coders receive training
in the mechanics of
coding, but care is




Use of Explicit coding rules Each text is approached Coding rules are not
coding are used to minimize individually to make used. Coders report
rules subjective judgment the most compelling their own subjective
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TABLE I
Continued
Issue Traditional content Interpretive content Reception based
abalysis analysis content analysis
and make the coding and contextually sen- readings of the text.
process public. sitive interpretations.
Inter-coder Inter-coder agreement When researchers work The level of consen-
agreement is used to demonstrate in teams, the teams sus about the mean-
that coders success- work collaboratively ing of the texts is a
fully followed the to arrive at the most research finding,
coding rules. compelling interpreta- not a measure of
tions. research quality.
Justifying Inter-coder agreement The justifiability of The coders are not
interpretations is used to indicated each interpretation is required to justify
of the focal that the coding rules assessed individually. their subjective
texts were followed. The redings of the focal
coding rules are texts. However,
assessed by a direct researchers may seek




Finding the optimal type of content analysis
The researchers The researchers arenot the focal
are the focal interpreters
interpreters
There is a strong (1) Use traditional (2) Use traditional content analysis.
natural consensus content analysis.
about the coding
of the texts
Is reception based content analysis
practical?
Coding categories (3) Use traditional (4) If it is practical, (5) If reception
are denotatively content analysis. use reception based content
based, so inter-coder based content analysis is not




Coding categories (6) Use interpretive (7) If it is practical, (8) If reception
are complex, so content analysis. use reception based based content
inter-rater reliability content analysis. analysis is not
is difficult to achieve practical, use
interpretive
content analysis.
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APPENDIX II
Figure 1. Model Of The Content Analytic Process.
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Figure 2. Example Of Connotative And Denotative Meanings.
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Figure 3. Model or Spokesperson?
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